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BANK DIRECTORS: HEIGHTENED EXPECTATIONS 
AND BLURRED LINES IN A CHANGING 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
A CONVERSATION FROM THE CLEARING HOUSE 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On November 21, 2014, the Center for Banking and Finance at 
the University of North Carolina School of Law hosted a dialogue on 
heightened expectations and blurred lines for bank directors in a 
changing regulatory environment at The Clearing House’s Annual 
Conference.1 Biographical information about the moderators and the 
panelists is set forth before the transcript of the dialogue begins. 
 
Moderators 
Lissa L. Broome is the Wells Fargo Professor of Banking Law 
at the University of North Carolina School of Law and also the Director 
of the Center for Banking and Finance. 
Derek M. Bush is a Partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & 
Hamilton LLP, where his practice focuses on advising domestic and 
international financial institutions and foreign sovereigns regarding U.S. 
bank regulatory matters and legislation. 
 
Panelists 
Michael S. Helfer is the Managing Director of The Ice Glen 
Group   LLC   and   former   Vice-Chairman,   General   Counsel,     and 
 
1. The Clearing House is the oldest banking association and payments company in 
the United States, having been established in 1853. It is owned by the world’s largest 
commercial banks. The Clearing House Payments Company L.L.C. provides payment, 
clearing, and settlement services to its member banks and other financial institutions, 
clearing almost $2 trillion daily and representing nearly half of the automated- 
clearinghouse, funds-transfer, and check-image payments made in the United States. The 
Clearing House L.L.C. is a nonpartisan advocacy organization representing the interests of 
its owner banks on a variety of important banking issues. 
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Corporate Secretary of Citi. He is a member of the boards of directors  
of Banamex, the second largest bank in Mexico, and of EP Energy 
Corp., an oil and gas exploration and development company. 
Jewell Hoover is Principal at Hoover and Associates, a Director 
at Fifth Third Bank, former OCC District Deputy Comptroller, and co- 
author of The Ultimate Guide for Bank Directors.2 
Oliver (Ollie) Ireland is a Partner at Morrison & Foerster LLP, 
where his practice focuses on retail financial services and bank 
regulatory issues. 
Martin (Marty) Pfinsgraff is the Senior Deputy Comptroller 
for Large Bank Supervision with the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency. He also serves as a member of the OCC’s Executive 
Committee and the Committee on Bank Supervision. He previously 
served as Deputy Comptroller for Credit and Market Risk. 
II. HEIGHTENED EXPECTATIONS FROM THE REGULATORS 
 
Bush: This is a topic that really does not require a lot of 
introduction for a few reasons.  One is it has been either an explicit or  
an implicit part of many of the discussions we have had at earlier 
sessions of The Clearing House Conference. There has also been a 
steady stream of guidance, both at the national level and  the 
international level, that I know everyone is focused on. This guidance 
includes not only the OCC’s Heightened Standards,3 but also the Basel 
Consultative Document from October 2014, 4 the Group of Thirty paper 
from 2013,5 and an intriguing speech by Federal Reserve Governor 
Tarullo from the summer of 2014,6  posing a question about whether  we 
 
2. CATHERINE A. GHIGLIERI & JEWELL D. HOOVER, THE ULTIMATE GUIDE FOR BANK 
DIRECTORS (AuthorHouse 2011). 
3. OCC Guidelines Establishing Heightened Standards for Certain Large Insured 
National Banks, Insured Federal Savings Associations, and Insured Federal Branches, 79 
Fed. Reg. 54518 (Sept. 11, 2014), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-09- 
11/pdf/2014-21224.pdf. 
4. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES FOR BANKS (Oct. 2014), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs294.pdf. 
5. GROUP OF THIRTY, A NEW PARADIGM: FINANCIAL INSTITUTION BOARDS AND 
SUPERVISORS (Oct. 2013), available at 
http://www.group30.org/images/PDF/Banking_Supervision_CG.pdf. 
6. Dan K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks at 
the Association of American Law Schools Midyear Meeting: Corporate Governance and 
Prudential      Regulation      17–18      (June      9,      2014)      (transcript      available       at 
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should change the way we define the fiduciary duties of directors. Most 
importantly, for the last few years this is really an area where The 
Clearing House has been a leader in the industry discussion of director 
duties and their role in corporate governance of banks. You probably 
know that The Clearing House has released an exposure draft of its 
Guiding Principles for Enhancing Banking Organization Corporate 
Governance, originally issued in June 2012, republished in an updated 
form in September 2014,7 on which The Clearing House is soliciting 
comments. The Guiding Principles have been a really important part of 
the discussion and a way for the industry to help shape its response to 
the ongoing guidance and standards being promulgated by supervisors 
and other policymakers. 
So picking up on Comptroller of the Currency Curry’s speech 
given at the Annual Conference,8 Marty, from your perspective,  
thinking about the OCC’s Heightened Standards, what would you draw 
attention to as the highlights of the Heightened Standards? The 
articulation of director duties and expectations in the original proposal 
was a bit of a lightning rod for the industry and drew a lot of comments. 
From where you sit, how do you think about that? 
 
Pfinsgraff: Some thought we were seeking, in some way, to 
change the role of directors and I think that is clearly not the case. We 
were seeking to clarify, not change the role of a director. We continue  
to see the role of the board as hiring the CEO, being involved in 
approving strategy, approving key policies such as risk appetite 
statements, and to have audit report into the board. In addition to the 
roles just mentioned, we also see the board having a role in validating 
that the risk framework that the organization has put in place is 
operating appropriately. Finally, from a risk management perspective 
(and we had a fair amount of debate on this internally), as has been 
discussed in some international white papers, should risk    management 
 
 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20140609a.pdf). 
7. THE CLEARING HOUSE, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR ENHANCING BANKING 
ORGANIZATION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Exposure Draft Sept. 2014), available at 
https://www.theclearinghouse.org/issues/banking-regulations/dodd-frank/corporate- 
governance/20140910-tch-exposure-draft-on-corporate-governance. 
8. Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at the Annual Conference 
of The Clearing House Association (Nov. 21, 2014) (transcript available at 
http://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2014/pub-speech-2014-160.pdf). 
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report into the board?  Some observers have answered that “yes,” but  
we answered that “no.”  Risk management should not report directly  
into the board. We see audit as a check and balance. Obviously, it is 
looking backward and validating as to whether certain actions  took 
place. Were disclosures appropriate? Was reporting appropriate? So, 
audit is a look-back function.  We think it is very appropriate for audit  
to report directly into the audit committee of the board. We see risk 
management very differently. It includes both current and prospective 
judgments being made. Oftentimes, in most organizations on a day-to- 
day basis, there is some reconciliation required between the front line 
and risk management. That is a management function. That is not a 
board function. Having said that, we do think Chief Risk Officers 
(“CRO”) need to have unfettered access to the board and to the risk 
committee of the board, and that is more or less the language we used in 
the guidelines. We concluded that risk management is a management 
function that reports to the CEO. The CEO needs to arbitrate on 
occasion between the front line and the risk management function. If 
there are issues that arise between the CEO and the CRO, the CRO can 
then take those to the board. So, this was not an attempt to change 
structure. I think it was an opportunity to clarify where we felt based 
upon some of the issues that arose during the crisis, clarification was 
necessary or appropriate. 
 
Broome: Marty, the guidelines talk about the board 
“challenging” management. Could you give us some sense of what you 
think that looks like and how that is going to affect the board 
relationship? How is the examiner going to measure that or establish 
whether that challenge has occurred? 
 
Pfinsgraff: There were a lot of questions as to whether the 
expectation of board challenge is somehow going to change the 
dynamics with the board.  Certainly when we look at challenge, we  
think it occurs in multiple ways across every organization. We see 
challenge occurring where it arises as boards discuss strategy or boards 
discuss problem issues.  So, it can occur in a board meeting.  I would  
say it often occurs off-line. It occurs in one-on-one conversations that 
the lead director or the chairman of the board has with the CEO. It 
occurs in discussions that heads of risk audit or governance  committees 
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have with the CEO or senior management, and that is typically where 
that occurs. So, interestingly enough, those are usually not areas where 
regulators are present. As we look at where there has been the most 
progress in the six or seven categories that we think comprise our 
Heightened Standards, the most progress has been made in credible 
challenge by the board. You might ask, “How in the heck are you doing 
that? You just said, you are not there when that occurs.” One of the 
things that my predecessor, Mike Brosnan, did when rolling out 
Heightened Expectations in 2010, was to require that our Examiners in 
Charge (“EIC”) meet informally with boards, individual directors, risk 
committees, and audit committees on a regular basis. That is  now  
taking place. I’m not saying it is perfect, but it is absolutely part of the 
evaluation process of our examiners in charge. What we have seen  
come out of those informal discussions is a better understanding by our 
examiners in charge of what is taking place informally in those off-line 
sessions between chairmen, lead directors, heads of committees, and 
management—including the CEO. I have also gotten feedback from 
directors that this has been helpful to them in terms of understanding  
our concerns, the priority of our concerns, and therefore, being in a 
better position to provide challenge. So, we are seeing progress in this 
area. I think that for most boards challenge occurs in meetings, but 
mostly off-line. We have been very encouraged by the progress that we 
have seen. 
 
Bush: There is a parallel expectation that sometimes plays out 
and can arise in exams, which is an expectation of credible challenge by 
risk functions to a line of business, with institutions feeling like the way 
that a supervisor can measure a credible challenge is by looking to how 
many times a business initiative or transaction was denied by a risk 
function. In other words, show me the results of this challenge in some 
number of times when the challenge actually had effect. Is there a risk, 
Mike and Ollie, that examiners will want to see boards turn something 
down to prove the challenge? Or, is it going to be enough that the 
supervisors can measure the behind the scenes discussions and get at the 
more intangible effect? 
 
Ireland: The risk function in the bank should be working with 
the business function and they should work those things out along the 
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way. For it to get to the point where somebody has a product that they 
want to put in the market and the risk people say, “You cannot put that 
product in the market,” then there is probably a failure in 
communication. I think the same thing is true in the board process.  So, 
if you have some sort of a quota of rejected proposals, I think you are 
going completely in the wrong direction. 
 
Helfer: I think that sometimes there will be a proposal which 
will work its way through and get to a risk person too late. I think 
Ollie’s point is right. If the company spent a lot of money preparing a 
product or business plan and then it finally gets to a senior risk person 
that rejects it, there probably has not been enough internal 
communication. But in general, risk has to work with business, even as  
it is an independent monitor of the business. 
Stepping back, when regulators and supervisors first began 
talking about challenge before there were any proposals, it started 
informally through the examination process. I think there was a lot of 
concern about what challenge means. Challenge sounds  
confrontational. Is that what is expected? I know some examiners were 
told by banks, “Well, tell me how many challenges you want per board 
meeting and we will make sure they are there. What is the quota? How 
many turn downs do you need? We will make proposals we know will 
be turned down and you want the word ‘challenge’ in every other 
paragraph in the minutes.” But, as described by Marty, the OCC seems 
to have a reasonably sophisticated understanding of how challenge 
works. As long as that is communicated, as long as you understand that 
challenge happens in the committees, it happens in board discussions, it 
happens in other discussions, and as long as the inquiries by the 
examination staff are to that effect, challenge can be discussed and 
measured. 
If, however, an examiner comes in and says, “When was the last 
time you challenged management?” You are going to get a very 
defensive reaction. The directors are going to say, “Hey we need some 
of this challenge stuff. Solve this problem for me.” But, if  the  
examiners are engaging in a sophisticated discussion of -- “What is 
going on with the business? What are the things that are coming up?” -- 
to get a more nuanced and subtle understanding, it can be very 
productive for the institution and the directors. 
  
 
 
2015] CHANGING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 7 
 
Bush: This sounds like an implementation challenge because  
the way you described it was very nuanced. I think we have all 
experienced that for an examiner sometimes, if something is not written 
down, it does not exist. It is going to be very difficult to find evidence  
of “challenge” for all the reasons we just talked about. But, is there  
room in writing the minutes to address this issue? Is this something 
boards should think about in the draft minutes that they review? 
 
Helfer: There has been a progression. I am old enough that 
when I started practicing law about 100 years ago, minutes were a long 
list of who actually came to the meeting, said the board passed the 
following resolutions, the board talked about a bunch of stuff, and then 
they left. The theory was, the less you say, the better.  Over time, at  
least in the banking business, that has become dramatically different. 
Boards want more of the discussion reflected in the minutes. The 
regulators want to see more of the discussion reflected in the minutes.  
As long as the supervisors are not looking for the number of times the 
word “challenge” or any other particular word is used, I think this is a 
good development. 
I know in some institutions, the committee minutes are also 
increasingly detailed and are provided to all the directors even those that 
are not on the committee. They just go into the board book.  I think that 
is a good idea too, because it gives people who are not on the audit 
committee, not on the risk committee -- in addition to the reports they 
get, which are sometimes very summary -- they actually get the minutes 
of the committee meeting and see the nature of the discussions. So, I 
think there has been an effect on the minute writing. 
 
Broome: Jewell, you sit in a boardroom. In your experience, is 
your work as a board member always reflected in the minutes? And is 
what happens in the boardroom all of the board’s work or does some of 
it happen outside the boardroom? 
 
Hoover: Typically, board minutes do not reflect all the 
discussions in the boardroom or in the committee meetings.  It is just  
not possible to capture everything. We have talked about a credible 
challenge to management.       We need a credible discussion on various 
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issues and you cannot capture all of that because there is a healthy 
debate that is ongoing in meetings. If the examiners are looking at the 
minutes, they cannot ascertain everything that has gone on in the 
meeting. 
In terms of those credible challenges or discussions, I agree with 
the other panel members that a great way of doing that is to have 
informal meetings with the regulators. At Fifth Third, we do that. We  
try to have a very provocative and interactive  communication process 
on a regular basis with the regulators. We meet with our EIC and our 
chair of the risk committee. We meet with the examiner in charge and 
other departmental areas. We talk about things that are going on within 
the bank, the expectations of the regulators, and what is going on within 
the boardroom. So I think that what is presented in the board minutes is 
a way of letting the regulators know our thought processes. 
 
Broome: What about documenting the other conversations that 
might occur off-line? Would that be helpful for the regulators? Should 
you note to the file that “I met on this date and talked with so and so, 
and made a challenge.” Is that something that the regulators are going  
to be looking for or that the lawyers would advise their clients to make 
sure they are documenting? 
 
Pfinsgraff: I had the privilege of being on eight or nine boards.  
I am on two today, but no bank boards. When I see how that process 
plays out, challenge begins with the questions that directors ask, 
typically during the meetings or even sometimes off-line, but the 
challenge occurs if they do not feel they have gotten fulsome or accurate 
answers. In either of those cases, if the answer is not fulsome  or 
accurate, we do have an expectation that a director will follow-up to 
make certain that they get a fulsome and accurate response to those 
questions. It is in that area, when we have these discussions with Jewell 
or other directors, where we get a perspective that is shared with us— 
here are the questions that are being asked, and then here is the follow- 
up that we are expecting to see as a director to answer that question in a 
fulsome and accurate way. Clearly, if over time you are not getting  
what you consider to be fulsome and accurate responses, there have to 
be consequences from that. As a director, if you are saying, “This does 
not seem right, we are not getting either the right responses, the right 
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level of response, or we keep getting surprised,” then there is a problem. 
This whole initiative around heightened standards came about because 
serving through the crisis we saw too many boards where there were 
surprises and the boards did not necessarily have a perspective on the 
aggregate level of risk that the institution was taking. The board 
members may not have been completely knowledgeable about certain 
product risks that were being incurred or were unfamiliar with what 
certain lines of businesses were actually doing. This was certainly a way 
for us to try to reinforce and clarify that those are things that we expect  
directors,  certainly  at  the  committee  level,  to  have  a decent 
understanding of those issues. 
 
Bush: The board’s oversight and the risk committee’s oversight 
of risk is obviously a key part of the standards. Jewell, just from your 
own experience, how do you see the board and its risk oversight 
function? 
 
Hoover: Risk management has evolved over the years. Risk 
management today is not your father’s risk management in terms of 
identifying, measuring, monitoring, and controlling risk. Risk 
management has evolved to enterprise risk management and the 
fulsome, holistic process of managing it. That culture of risk 
management today is embedded in the entire board process, not just the 
risk committee. Clearly, the majority of risk management has been 
delegated to the risk committee of a board, but it is also important that 
every board member be involved in risk management in terms of 
establishing what the risk appetite is and what control systems the bank 
has around that process. 
Governor Tarullo gave a speech in June 2014 where he said that 
risk is not reducible to a single metric.10 I agree with that. Boards make 
risk decisions in almost everything that they do. It is fairly amorphous. 
If we could reduce it to a metric we could say, “This is it.” We could 
identify it, isolate it, and then put a box around it. But it is never that 
simple. So I think the board has to be fully engaged in the risk process. 
The paradigm has changed. It is a very complex process.  So,  
delegating  it  to  the  risk  committee  is  simply  not  enough.    I  think 
 
 
10. Tarullo, supra note 6, at 9. 
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regulators expect that all board members have a fiduciary responsibility 
to look at risk. 
Risk is also a bifurcated process with compliance now. In the 
past, we would have had our prudential regulator for compliance, but 
now we also have the CFPB. So we have to look at compliance risk 
from not only a technical standpoint, where we comply with consumer 
laws, but also, at what is the risk to the consumer. So, it is a holistic 
process and the board has to be fully involved in that entire area. 
 
Helfer: At the same time, a board that consists entirely of risk 
experts is a board that has one absolutely critical element of oversight 
under control, but may not have other elements of oversight under 
control. So while I agree with Jewell that every board member has to 
have a basic understanding of the bank’s risk appetite, there is also a 
need on the board for other areas of expertise. I think the questions  
from the board standpoint, and the regulator’s standpoint should be, 
“Does the board as a whole, have the right set of expertise? Are there 
people who understand the information technology  and  cyber-risks? 
Are there people who understand compliance and control issues?” Not 
everybody has to be an expert in all of those things. Risk committee 
members should be completely fluent on the details of risk, but every 
board member does not need to have that level of command regarding 
risk. 
 
Pfinsgraff: I echo what Mike just said. When we look at boards 
and at board composition, we are typically looking for that diversity that 
he is talking about. Not everybody can be an expert in all areas, in all 
lines of business, and all activities and kinds of risk that an organization 
is coming under. So, we are typically looking to see if the board has a 
question process where you are questioning assumptions that are in a 
strategy or a plan. You want the right people with the right diversity of 
experience, whether it is an HR issue, or whether it is a risk  
management issue in your commodities business (which would be very 
different from a risk management issue in a retail business, or a bond 
business). So having a diverse board really gives that perspective of 
people asking and questioning assumptions, but from a position of their 
own expertise and what they bring to the table. That really  is  the 
essence of why you want to have a diverse board. 
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Bush: The way you described the expectations of the board to 
oversee risk and evaluate and approve the risk appetite, it is very 
difficult to express a concern about that. But in practice, there is 
probably a perception that the expectation is more granular than that. If 
directors start to perceive that, is there a risk that we will in fact see 
boards drift towards a greater number of people with real risk expertise 
and as risk management gets more sophisticated, directors wanting to 
understand what they are hearing from the CRO in the meetings? Is 
there some risk that as a matter of practice that happens even though 
everyone agrees with the virtue of diversity on the board? I see that 
Ollie is nodding. 
 
Ireland: Particularly, I see it today in the compliance world. If 
you can expect granularity and people to actually understand  
compliance requirements going forward, and compliance is a very 
substantial risk these days -- retail compliance in particular since the 
CFPB has gotten involved, but also wholesale compliance -- then you 
are going to have to know an awful lot of detail to understand it. I think 
that we are starting to move beyond the board function. I agree with 
Marty’s description of what the board should do. I do not see that they 
can deal with individual risks in many cases. They can deal with an 
architecture that is designed to address those risks, but they cannot be in 
the business of assessing individual risks from individual products in 
anything but exceptional circumstances. 
 
Broome: Obviously these guidelines are really applicable only 
to the largest national banks and I am wondering to what extent, Mike, 
do you think banks that are not formally subject to these guidelines 
should pay attention to them? 
 
Helfer: I think it would be imprudent for community banks or 
smaller banks not technically covered to not try to glean some lessons 
and some guidance about what the regulatory expectations are going to 
be. The analogy I might use is  that the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements  
did not apply to non-profits, for example, but many large non-profits 
have looked at the Sarbanes-Oxley requirements and tried to figure out 
from them what is best practice.  So, I think it would be worth taking   a 
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look and seeing what you could draw out of those in terms of what 
regulatory expectations are, and what best practices are. In many ways, 
as Marty has said and as the Comptroller said earlier in his speech, these 
guidelines repeat and clarify some pretty standard expectations about 
what boards do. 
 
Broome: Ollie, how do you think the Fed views these new 
guidelines and will it apply similar guidelines at the holding company 
level? 
 
Ireland: The typical culture of the Fed is to take a somewhat 
more moderate tone than the OCC will take and some of the other bank 
regulators will take. Are they going to be influenced by it and move in 
those general directions?  I think so. 
 
Bush: There was an interesting discussion at an earlier panel of 
this conference about the question of culture. Is there a problem that a 
bank may have a strong overall culture, but a micro-culture that 
develops within an institution, for example, of traders who feel greater 
loyalty to their counterparts at other institutions than to their employer? 
There was this issue of a challenge of how to figure that out and prevent 
it or deal with it, but from the board’s perspective. There is an 
expectation that the board is going to be part of defining a bank’s 
culture, which already begs the question about how the board should go 
about doing that. Maybe you could talk a little about how the board 
should do that generally. Is it realistic to expect the board to be able to 
figure out something like the micro-culture problem? 
 
Pfinsgraff: I think culture can be measured. I would bet that 
when Jewell was an examiner, she could go into a bank and figure that 
out relatively quickly and have an assessment of the culture of that 
institution, whether it was risk culture, compliance culture, however you 
want to classify it. Culture is simply the normative behavior of a group 
of people. We basically can measure that when we observe patterns of 
behavior.  We typically are not looking at transactions, we are looking  
at patterns of behavior and are trying to evaluate and draw conclusions 
from those patterns of behavior, not necessarily from specific 
transactions.  I think boards do the same thing.  If I were to observe as a 
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director or as an examiner, and I am seeing a pattern of behavior that 
either goes deep into a particular line of business, to your point, a 
subculture, and then I can see that pattern of behavior evident at  
multiple levels in a particular line of business, or when I start to see a 
pattern of behavior that cuts across lines of businesses, I can then draw 
conclusions around what is the culture. Again, culture is the normative 
behavior of a group of people. So, I do think it is something that is 
measurable. Whether you are a director or an examiner, you are 
basically looking for recurring patterns of behavior over time, either 
within or across a particular organization or line of business. 
 
Ireland: I can tell you that when I was at the Fed we had 
definitive views about the cultures of various banks, including large 
banks, small banks, and holding companies. If I talked to any 
supervisory people, they sometimes got quite excited about those 
judgments and differences in them. When you talk about a sub-culture,  
it brings back to me the memory of Nick Leeson who was the trader in 
Singapore who brought down Barings Bank. The  interesting  thing 
about it was that the Singapore monetary authority did a report of an 
analysis of how this happened and the Bank of England did an analysis 
of how it happened and the reports were not even close. They did not 
agree with each other on almost anything. If you believe the Bank of 
England, management should not have caught the rogue trader. If you 
believe the Singapore monetary authority, management should have 
caught him, but maybe not the board. I think that is expecting an awful 
lot of boards, to think that the board can catch kind of rouge trader in all 
cases. 
 
Helfer: Ollie, to your knowledge, did the Fed communicate its 
views about the institution’s culture to the outside directors of those 
institutions? 
 
Ireland: I do not think they did as good a job of that as they 
should have. We had markedly divergent views about some banking 
organizations and we actually got feedback from the banking 
organizations indicating that they knew that. I do not think that was  
well communicated to the boards of directors. I think that the 
supervisors gave more filtered feedback to the board than was occurring 
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within the Fed organization. 
Bush: Most banks perceive themselves as having a strong 
culture of compliance, with some version of “do the right thing” as a 
motto. How does the board get a handle on the culture of an institution 
from sitting in the boardroom, talking to management in the hallway, or 
even in informal meetings? How do you really understand the bank’s 
culture? Is it the way that supervisors try to understand it—inferences 
from bad acts—or is there more a board can do? 
 
Hoover: I will revert back to my regulator days. Marty  
indicated that examiners can tell you, almost to 99% certainty, what a 
bank’s culture is and its personality. The way we made that assessment 
is if there is a distinction between the bank’s written policies and 
actually what is going on in a bank, then the culture is exactly what is 
happening on the ground. You can measure that from a board 
perspective in terms of how many exceptions to policy are there. How 
many breaches of a certain position or policy do you have? 
A board should directly engage with senior management at a 
certain level in conversations. For instance, the board will have 
conversations at a board dinner with various levels of management and 
those conversations can tell you a lot informally about what is going on 
in an institution. So, if there is a stark difference between written policy 
and actually what is happening, that is going to tell the board member if 
there is an adherence to their tone at the top. I think that  board  
members really need to be attuned to that, without overreaching, and 
probably having appropriate conversations with various levels of 
management and drilling down in the organization. I think part of your 
oversight role is to really know what is going on in an institution. I 
would start with those broad policy precepts versus exceptions, attitudes 
and behaviors. Those are things that are pretty obvious. You are going  
to see them. If there is a breach, it is going to stand out, and it is going  
to come to the board in some type of way in their management 
information systems. 
 
Ireland: I think that is right. I think there is a problem with the 
contrary pattern. If you are not seeing that, can you assume that 
everything is fine?  And, I am not sure that is the case. 
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Hoover: No, that is not the case. I think that you have to be  
very smart about what you are not seeing and that raises a red flag in 
itself. 
 
Bush: What can the board do to actually set the culture of an 
institution, not just to be on the lookout for potential problems in the 
culture? 
 
Pfinsgraff: At least on the boards I have been on that have 
worked well, I think it is precisely what Jewell is saying. You look for 
those instances where you can reinforce either good behavior or 
ostracize bad behavior. The role of the board goes beyond simply 
coming up with a set of words for a risk appetite statement, or  
approving a risk framework, or values. Ultimately, you have an 
opportunity to observe whether or not the actions on the ground are 
consistent with those value statements, risk appetite statements, and  
with what your expectations are. If they are not, then the board should 
be looking to see, whether there are appropriate consequences to that. 
And again, I think that works both good and bad. It is reinforcing good 
behaviors and it is obviously taking action to hold people accountable 
when there are not good behaviors. You can get a perspective as to 
whether or not management is coming to you and saying, “Well this is 
an exception. This went wrong and there are really a lot of reasons for 
this.” There are always reasons for it, but at the end of the day, if you 
see a pattern of that behavior, then the board really does need to step up 
and take actions to make certain that those values and those risk 
statements are being reinforced both positively and negatively and that 
people are held accountable. 
 
Ireland: That is probably one of the reasons you emphasized 
challenge in the guidance. 
 
Pfinsgraff: Yes, exactly. 
 
Broome: Marty, in the proposed guidelines commenters said 
that perhaps you were looking for boards to be engaged in active 
management of the institution.         Can you describe how you think the 
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final guidelines have dealt with that issue about boards getting into the 
management side? 
 
Pfinsgraff: We are sensitive to this and we did get a lot of 
feedback. The focus was primarily around the use of the  word  
“ensure.” That word presupposed in the reader’s mind, based on 
feedback, that the board can somehow guarantee a result and that may 
potentially increase liability. We stopped using “ensure.” We changed 
the language so we used “validate” or other words that do not 
necessarily imply that the board is providing a guarantee and thereby  
has to now get engaged in actual management. 
When you have an institution with a set of problems that look 
like they are starting to become problematic for that entity, I do think 
boards change their behavior. You do validate more. I am certainly 
seeing this. We have nineteen large banks and we have an average of 
sixty-five MRAs and probably one or more consent orders that are in 
place in those organizations. We are not at a highest water mark in that 
regard, but neither are we where we would like to be, nor at where the 
institutions would like to be. That is where we are seeing more 
engagement by the board because the board is cognizant of the fact that 
you want to get back to a business as usual mode. Oftentimes that  
means the board needs to step up. 
I do think that there are points in time in any organization where 
things become more challenging. You may have to change  
management. When you are at those times, the boards are engaged and 
sometimes it may look like they are crossing the line because they 
ultimately need to go and validate through the challenge process, but 
that is part of the process of fulfilling their fiduciary duty. We pulled 
away. We stopped using “ensure,” but I feel a little uncomfortable with 
that because I think this is a perceptual issue. In practice, we are not 
looking for boards to guarantee results or step into the role of 
management, but we do think that when it comes to ensuring that you 
have a good CEO, ensuring that the risk framework that has been 
established is appropriate for the size, complexity, and risk profile of 
that institution, boards have a fairly significant responsibility. 
 
Hoover: I agree with that in terms of boards and oversight 
responsibility.  As a practical matter, a board member always knows the 
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matters requiring immediate attention because they have access to the 
report of examination where they are discussed. So, every board  
member oversees a process of remediation for those matters requiring 
attention. Having said that, are all matters requiring attention created 
equal? The answer is “no.” Boards may have to step up their game in 
terms of whatever is going on in that institution. For example, in  
matters requiring attention, a board mandate to inject capital in a bank is 
going to receive more urgency than one where there is a need to reduce 
an accounting policy to writing. 
In the end, the board is responsible for “ensuring” corrective 
action is accomplished. I think at some point it may be semantics, but I 
agree the board has a responsibility to make sure that those things are 
correct. I think the thing we take away is an awareness of an issue and 
awareness that there has to be corrective action. Oversight is ensuring 
that management is executing a corrective action plan. Accountability 
stops with the board to make sure that it happens. 
 
Bush: The question of the meaning of “ensure” reminds me of 
how that issue comes up in the context of enforcement and consent 
orders. When the order says that the board shall ensure x, and the board 
says, “Oh no, we cannot ensure x and we especially cannot ensure it in a 
consent order.” Sometimes we try to revise the words, but there 
developed a practice of defining “ensure,” to mean “exercise  
appropriate oversight and management.” Sort of the same semantic 
issue. Mike and Ollie, do you think the final guidance struck the right 
balance, and, more importantly in practice, will it be implemented with 
that appropriate balance? 
 
Ireland: I drafted regulations and guidance for part of my life 
and so I try not to hold it against the drafters. It is very hard to capture 
exactly what you are trying to do in two or three pages or in a paragraph 
on the board of directors’ role in a more complex document. The 
concern I have is that the examiners reading the language go overboard. 
I think that happens more than it should. There may be less control of 
examiner discretion from Washington than sometimes even the agencies 
would like and that a lot of the institutions would like. 
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III. THE BURDEN ON BOARDS 
 
Bush: Let’s talk about some of the burdens and other challenges 
that fall on the board. It does seem that when new regulatory policies  
are adopted it is increasingly common, as a way to emphasize their 
importance and make sure they are implemented properly, to have a 
board approval requirement. For instance, board approval of an AML 
program or Volcker Rule compliance program, sometimes combined 
with a CEO attestation. Once the board approval requirement is there, 
then it continues even as those new requirements become more ordinary 
course. Is that the right approach, or should the board approval 
requirement be allowed to evolve or sunset as regulatory regimes are 
implemented? How significant of a burden is such an approval 
requirement on the board? 
 
Pfinsgraff: I think it creates a dynamic. Parts of the dynamic  
are useful and parts of it are a waste of time. I have seen people write 
that into rules. The people who write it into rules do not necessarily 
have a holistic view of the board of director’s role. It causes 
management of the organization to spend a lot of time and a lot of effort 
in making sure they pay attention to those issues, and to that extent the 
requirement is probably achieving its goal. The package that then gets  
to the board is probably not, in many cases, meaningfully reviewable 
because it is simply so voluminous and so detailed that the board can 
only review it in the most summary way. I do think it would be 
beneficial at some point to go through and weed those things out 
periodically because a lot of them were big issues ten or twenty years 
ago, and probably not in many cases what you want your board focusing 
on today. 
 
Bush: Jewell, in your experience, are there things that 
management presents for approval that you think in the back of your 
mind, “I probably do not need to approve this,” but it is a regulation that 
requires it or some other standard that requires it? 
 
Hoover: Most of the time there is a regulatory requirement that 
the board approves certain policies and examiners look for that during 
the examination.   I think from  a  governance perspective, most  boards 
  
 
 
2015] CHANGING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 19 
adopt a process where policies are updated on an annual basis. Some 
policies may have a sunset and some not. But from a holistic  
standpoint, boards should review all policies to make sure that they are 
still current; that they fit current lines of business; and that they identify 
the risks. So, it is a governance process. It is good governance, but also 
regulators look to make sure that the board has accomplished their 
fiduciary responsibilities by reviewing and approving those policies. 
Now, having said that, Ollie said that the volume of it is a lot, and it is. 
The whole board cannot be expected to read all policies in detail. But  
on some level, the various committees are familiar with the policies, 
depending on where that responsibility lies. They can talk with the 
person who is developing the policy so that particular committee will 
have a more detailed knowledge of exactly what is there. 
 
Broome: Continuing with this theme of burden on the board -- 
we are asking the board to do a lot.  Mike, during 2008, Citi’s board  
was certainly taxed. How many times do you think it met during that 
year? 
 
Helfer: Well, the Chairman of the Audit Committee at the time, 
Larry Ricciardi, who kept track of these things, told me that in 2008, if 
you add up actual board meetings, board briefings (which are not formal 
meetings), and audit committee meetings, he participated in eighty 
meetings during the course of 2008. That hopefully was an 
extraordinary year. But in times of crises, the board does have to step 
up. Even in crises that may not be as dramatic as 2008 was, when there 
has to be a change in management or other personnel action, boards 
meet a lot and it takes a great deal of time. 
 
Broome: Jewell, in more normal times, describe the number of 
board and committee meetings that you have and the time you devote to 
preparing for them, attending them, and following up afterwards. 
 
Hoover: I think this is the new normal. I do not think we will 
ever get back to where we were pre-recession because the world of 
banking has changed, the role of corporate governance has changed, and 
rightly so. I think that boards have to be smarter about how we view  
risk and how we view governance.  I chair the risk committee and I   am 
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a member of an audit committee. Between my board and committee 
meetings in 2014 I had twenty-two face-to-face meetings and another 
twenty to twenty-five telephone conferences of some length. So, in this 
new normal, I am looking at between forty to forty-five meetings per 
year. The time commitment is significant and rightly so, because the 
information boards have to review to have a “credible challenge” or 
discussion is simply great and the information is complex. For me to 
prepare for my quarterly board and committee meetings, I can easily 
spend three to four days reading the information and digesting it to be 
prepared to have those conversations at my committee meetings and at 
the board meetings. This is the new normal and I think that boards can 
continue to expect that this is going to happen. I think we are going to 
have even more regulatory requirements and rightfully so. The 
regulators want boards to build as big a box as possible to control and 
manage the risk. In order to do that, we are just simply going to have to 
spend more time. 
 
Bush: If that is the new normal, and there is no doubt a range of 
the number of meetings and time commitment across different kinds of 
institutions, does that too influence who likely is going to be willing to 
serve on a board in terms of expertise and available time?  I think in the 
U.K. there is some suggestion of a concept of a dedicated secretariat, a 
staff to support the board, beyond what the corporate secretary’s office 
does -- perhaps experts, not external advisors, but dedicated staff for the 
board. Can you imagine that becoming something that a board would 
need to get through the work? 
 
Hoover: Yes. We have dedicated staff in terms of our risk 
committee. They are not dedicated necessarily to the committee, but 
they spend an inordinate amount of time making sure that we have the 
right information. I spend time with those designated employees or 
experts on a monthly basis, or even more frequently with one-on-one 
touch-base meetings with them in terms of organizing committee work 
flow, what we are going to discuss, and what is going to be presented. 
When you get to your committee or your board meeting, it is almost 
anti-climatic. There is a lot of preparation behind the scenes between 
board members and the staff at the bank that they have to devote to us in 
terms  of  preparing  that  information.     Just  think   about  the     sheer 
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complexity of it. There is a whole back room operation dedicated to 
helping the board get that information and understand it. It is a team 
effort in terms of the staff at our institutions and a team effort in terms  
of our board members to have that synergy for making those decisions 
and participating in those discussions. 
 
Bush: When you talk about the staff, that is the bank’s 
employees and risk management. Could you imagine it going so far as 
the board having its own staff, separate from bank management?  In 
other words, what about an independent staff to support the directors in 
their independent role as directors? You would get the materials from 
the CRO and then you would talk to your own staff about what 
questions you should be asking. 
 
Hoover: I do not think we should go to the point of having 
centralized point of contact. I think that what we have now with various 
staff embedded throughout the bank is working properly. There just has 
to be a balance between how much is enough and the board members 
have a responsibility too, to keep that balance there. 
 
Broome: Well the people you are interacting with obviously 
have the substantive knowledge and expertise to help you. One could 
imagine an independent staff would then have to duplicate some of that 
institutional expertise and knowledge. 
 
Pfinsgraff: I do not know how that could work, having 
completely independent staff. One of the observations I made is that a 
director needs to figure out through asking questions whether they get 
fulsome and accurate responses. Well, am I determining whether my 
staff gave me fulsome and accurate responses, or am I determining 
whether management and their staff are giving me full and accurate 
responses. I think ultimately that what you are really trying to test is are 
you getting the right kind of support and the right responses in terms of 
accuracy and fulsomeness from management. When you start muddling 
that up with, “It was my staff that screwed up, it was not that 
management goofed up,” I think that would make things difficult. 
 
Broome: In addition to the folks that Jewell was talking   about, 
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Mike, obviously the corporate secretary’s function supports the board. 
Could you describe how that works and how the board decides when it 
is going to rely on the corporate secretary and when it is going to look  
to external advisors to bring in? 
 
Helfer: It has been a while since I have acted as corporate 
secretary, but it seems to me that is the key responsibility of the 
corporate secretary’s office -- which I believe typically should be the 
general counsel in the organization -- to make sure that the materials  
that go out to the board are complete and timely, properly summarized, 
and properly presented. The corporate secretary’s office is not going to 
do its own independent calculations of VAR, for example, but it can 
make sure that the right stuff is going into the board book, that it is 
understandable, that people are prepared to present to the board in an 
understandable way, and that the board book is going out in a timely 
fashion. That is in addition to all the checklist stuff, making sure that 
everything that has to get done, does get done. 
What Jewell described is very good. A good aspect of corporate 
governance is where the management assigns to each committee a 
senior member of management who is responsible for that committee, 
for making sure that that committee is getting its information, who has a 
relationship with the chairman, and who talks to the chairman before the 
meeting of the committee. Or, the general counsel does it with the CEO 
and the chairman of the board. “What do you want covered? Here is a 
proposed agenda.” So, the CRO would be the senior staff person for the 
risk committee. The general counsel would be assigned to the 
nomination and governance committee. The CFO would staff the audit 
committee, in addition to the role of the independent  auditor.  By 
putting that responsibility clearly on a very senior member of 
management and by holding that person accountable for getting the 
materials right, having that person create the relationship with the chair 
of the committee, you very quickly get from the board a sense of 
whether it is getting what it needs. 
 
Bush: Jewell touched earlier on the board’s role in overseeing 
resolution of MRAs and obviously it gets a copy of the exam report and 
reports from management on their resolution. A question for Marty. I 
think it was this fall, an OCC bulletin suggested that the board may 
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even need to, at least in some cases, unearth the root cause of the MRA. 
Do you have a sort of gloss on what the board’s responsibility is to 
ensure that MRAs are resolved and ideally that they do not reoccur? 
 
Pfinsgraff: First, I would say, it is not the board’s responsibility 
to determine root cause. That is, in fact, one of the 5 C’s that we are 
outlining in the MRA. What is the concern? What is the cause? What  
are the consequences? What are the corrective actions? What is the 
commitment that the bank is making to fix it? So, I do not see the board 
being involved in that that at all. 
From my perspective, management’s function is to oversee the 
remediation, the fix, and the follow up on any remediation relative to an 
MRA. I do think the board has a role in ensuring (I am going to use that 
word again) that management is following up appropriately on those 
MRAs and that ultimately those actions are being taken. That is an 
oversight role, no different than the board’s normal oversight function. 
This is getting back to what Jewell and I were talking about earlier. The 
informal discussions that directors are increasingly having with  our 
EICs is a great opportunity for directors to see whether the regulator’s 
perspective of both progress and rate of progress. What has actually 
been advanced? What is the rate at which things are being advanced  
and is it the same as management’s view? If management is telling 
them, “We are on track. We are doing this, we are doing that,” and they 
drill down with any one of our examiners and say, “Well, what do you 
think of this?” Our examiners will give them their perspective on 
whether or not we think management is on track, is dealing with this in 
a timely manner, and getting it done properly. That is a way for the 
directors to validate that what management is saying is,  in  fact, 
accurate. It is another area where those informal meetings have been 
beneficial. If you have sixty-five, on average, MRAs and it ranges from 
30 to 260 in our organizations, and you have got 200 MRAs, we are 
going to tell you, here are the ones we think are most important. These 
are the ones that have the greatest amount of urgency to them, so that 
the directors or committees can focus on ensuring that management is 
doing what it said it would do relative to those items. I do think that the 
board has that oversight role, but it is really management’s 
responsibility to get this done, not the board’s. 
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Bush: And Ollie, is that another issue that has some propensity 
to be a calibrated message from Washington, but perhaps with some 
divergence in the field? 
 
Ireland: I think so. 
 
Broome: Ollie, in June, Governor Tarullo posed a question 
about whether the fiduciary duties of the directors of regulated financial 
institutions should in some way be affirmatively changed to reflect 
regulatory objectives, like financial stability.11  Do you have any view  
on whether we could or should expect to see any change like that in the 
future? 
 
Ireland: I read that as floating an idea at the end of a speech  
that among other things criticized the Board’s own guidance on dealing 
with MRAs. I do not see how you can go in that direction, especially 
when you talk about financial stability issues. There is a lot of debate 
about the root causes, the problems that lead to the financial crisis. 
Different people have different views about how it might have been 
averted.  I think trying to require the individual board to go beyond  
what is good business for the bank is asking them to take on a job that 
they are not well equipped to do and also it puts them potentially in 
conflicts that are going to be hard to address. I really do not expect 
supervisory expectations to evolve in that direction over time. 
IV. ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND RETAIN DIRECTORS 
 
Broome: We have heard a lot about the time that is involved in 
being a director and the heightened standards that directors now need to 
be paying attention to. How are we going to be  able to recruit and  
retain directors in this new environment? If a good friend came and 
asked you for your advice about whether to go on the board of one of 
the globally significant financial institutions, a super regional bank, or a 
community bank, what would you say to each of those questions? 
 
Ireland: I always say “No. Do not do that.” My personal view  
is that the personal risk may get greater as you go down the scale 
 
11. Tarullo, supra note 6, at 10. 
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because the potential that the bank actually gets closed and somebody 
goes after the directors is higher in those cases than perhaps in a larger 
institution. But, I think the downside risks exceed the benefits that the 
individual would achieve. 
 
Broome: Mike? 
 
Helfer: I do not have any good friends who have the time and 
the expertise to do this, so it would be easy for me. If I did, the right 
lawyer answer is “No, no, no,” for the reasons that Ollie identified. I  
also strongly agree with Ollie that the risks get greater as you go down 
in size. Part of the reason is the likelihood of failure as a statistical 
matter and not because I think any institution is, or should be, too big to 
fail. Part of the reason is that the larger institutions have more  
capability of finding and paying and putting to work the kinds of  
support and expertise that are needed to comply with all of the 
expectations and requirements. I think that can get to be very hard in a 
community bank. In addition, the community banks are often very 
geographically focused, thereby increasing their risks. On the other 
hand, despite all the lawyer predictions that we will never be able to  
find anybody to go on boards, at least so far, I have not seen any 
dramatic curtailing of willingness to serve. I have been in situations 
where individuals have been approached and said, “You have got to be 
kidding,” but I have never been in a situation in which it was not 
possible to find a qualified person. 
 
Bush: Jewell, since you obviously did decide to go on a board, 
and maybe did not ask Mike and Ollie for advice, do you think your 
experience as a bank supervisor made you more confident about going 
on a board or did you think hard about it? 
 
Hoover: Yes to all of the above. Before I went on the Fifth 
Third board I was on the board of a small regional bank with about $4 
billion in assets. I did think hard about it, but the answer was easier for 
me because as a regulator I probably understood the banking industry a 
little better. I was at the OCC for almost thirty years and probably 
interacted with 1,500 bank boards of directors during that time period 
about  corporate  governance  on  some  level.    I  enjoyed  the  work.  I 
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enjoyed the discussion, the problem solving, and the collegial 
atmosphere. Collegial may seem like an oxymoron when it comes to 
bank regulators and bankers, but there is a lot of that collegiality in 
terms of the discussion. Going on a bank board had some of the same 
things that I enjoy and for me it was a natural extension of my skill set.  
I did understand the risk, but I also understood how to control those 
risks and how those discussions and questions and challenges should 
take place in the boardroom. Going on a bank board is a personal 
decision for each person. The reasons are very unique for each person, 
so they have to evaluate the opportunity and risks in that context. 
 
Bush: I guess I have to ask, Marty, whether it surprises you or 
troubles you that the conventional wisdom for a lawyer to give, if asked, 
would be do not do it? 
 
Pfinsgraff: It does not surprise me. We would be very 
concerned if we started to see a diminution in the quality of directors 
that are going on to boards, particularly at our largest institutions. We 
have not yet sensed that is a problem, but that is not to say that it could 
not become one. I am not surprised, however, by a lawyer making the 
recommendation not to join a bank board. 
V. EXPECTATIONS FOR THE HOLDING COMPANY BOARD AND THE BANK 
BOARD 
 
Bush: Mike, on boards where there is a high degree of overlap 
or overlap entirely between the holding company and the bank board, 
are there particular pitfalls or things to think about as a director or one 
advising directors in that role? 
 
Helfer: In principle, the one thing you do not want to be is the 
only independent member of a bank board who is not also on  the 
holding company board, because I think that is going to focus a huge 
amount of attention on that particular person as being the one who has  
to stand up to management and stand up to the holding company board. 
In my experience, this is not a current problem. It is more of a potential 
issue that needs to be thought about. You can imagine situations in 
which  there  is  tension  or  even  potential  conflicts  between  what the 
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holding company wants to do and what the bank, as a separate legal 
entity, views as being in its best interest, either in terms of transactions 
or in terms of the level of dividends and cash flow to the parent and the 
like. Those issues can arise within a framework where either decision is 
legal. Nobody is asking anybody to violate the dividend restrictions, but 
the question is how much you ought to do. Or, the transaction is legal 
for the bank, but not thought to be prudent, even though for the 
institution as a whole it has enormous benefits. I think as we move  
down the pike, you have the heightened expectations as we have been 
discussing applicable at the bank level, but not formally applicable at  
the holding company level. I think you have most boards of large 
regional holding companies, that I am familiar with at least, in which 
there is almost complete, if not complete, overlap between the holding 
company board and the bank board. When the OCC says you have to 
have “independent” directors on the bank board that means independent 
of management. It does not mean independent of the institution or 
independent of the holding company. I would not advise anybody to 
make any changes in process or procedure or change the paradigm right 
now, but I do think that directors and their lawyers need to be sensitive 
to the possibility of tensions coming up. 
 
Bush: Marty, since there is some variation -- especially if you 
bring in community banks in either degree of overlap or some holding 
companies may have two charters -- are there, beyond what is written in 
the heightened standards, preferred models from a supervisory 
perspective that you think work better? 
 
Pfinsgraff: I know that there are. I have been asked that 
question when we have once or twice intervened. No, we do not have 
guidelines on best practices. I do not think that you want us to write 
them. That would not be in anyone’s best interest. We know when 
something is not working. Ultimately, we are looking to ensure that 
there is independence. We would then expect to see greater challenge, 
particularly if you have a situation where you may have an 
extraordinarily dominant CEO or chairman-CEO. So we want to see 
that independence. We do not have a best practices model, but 
independence would enhance oversight. In our heightened standards we 
basically said we need to see at least two independent directors on the 
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bank board. But we have seen varying models. As Mike said, a lot of 
them are identical holding company and bank boards.  So you have got  
a very strong independent representation. We have some where it is 
management, head of the risk committee, head of the audit committee, 
and chair of the governance committee from the holding company board 
who would be sitting on the bank board. We do not have a perspective 
on best practice. We rarely intervene, but when we do it is only when 
we think that something is dysfunctional or not working properly. 
VI. AUDIENCE QUESTIONS 
 
Audience Member: Marty, the first traditional responsibility of 
the board you listed was for the board to hire the CEO. So, the CEO is 
accountable to the board, ultimately management is accountable to the 
board, and the board will hold management accountable. How would it 
play out in management holding the board accountable to these higher 
expectations? I am not talking about things that management can do to 
help the board be successful, such as training. If the board or individual 
board members over time are not meeting their obligations under these 
heightened expectations, what is the supervisory expectation of 
management, if any, to correct it? 
 
Pfinsgraff: Great question. Certainly, we do evaluate, and we 
have at times gone in and given counsel that we need to see a change on 
the board. In the same ways we have informal meetings with directors, 
we do to a greater degree have formal and informal meetings with 
management and others. I would hope there would be an opportunity to 
provide that kind of feedback in those informal meetings so that if you 
have dysfunction in the board, you could use us as a foil. It works both 
ways. Directors can raise issues around management and bounce them 
off of us and say, “What do you think of the CEO and how is he  
doing?” And we give our candid assessment.  I think it is fair game that 
it works the other way around too. 
 
Audience Member: In real life scandals since the  financial 
crisis -- the LIBOR manipulation, the FX manipulation -- can you speak 
to the role of the board? Can a board prevent something like this?  Can  
a board know about something that nobody knows about?   Once   these 
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things happen, do regulators, or anyone who investigates these 
wrongdoings, go back to the board and look at what it did or did not do 
to discover these issues? 
 
Pfinsgraff: The examples you raised are ones where there was 
collusion and fraud. It is extraordinarily difficult for managements to 
identify that ex-ante. It is extraordinarily difficult for regulators to 
identify it and so certainly we would not hold a board accountable. To 
the extent that you see a recurring pattern of collusion and fraud taking 
place within your organization, the response of regulators has been that 
we are calling into question the controls that you have in place and risk 
management that you have in place to be able to monitor and detect. 
When you see this issue in one area, normally our initial reaction would 
be, “Have you checked all of these other areas at the same time that  
have similar circumstances or are similarly situated where such 
collusion could take place?”  We would not sit here and whack the  
board in some way. 
In some cases, we have not necessarily gone and taken an action 
against senior management, other than we have typically called out 
weaknesses in control structures. It does raise a question about training, 
hiring, and obviously monitoring. This is where the board does have a 
role in making certain that appropriate actions are taken against those 
individuals that hold them accountable when you have had this kind of 
behavior. In the past, that would have been done in perhaps a less  
public way. Today, we are seeing organizations starting to take action  
in a more public way. In one situation where individuals were not 
involved directly in a problem, but they failed to report it, the 
organization will be challenged on any action they take on the 
individuals. They believe they will very likely lose that in court,  but 
they are still taking that action in order to send a very strong signal to 
that organization that these are our values and we mean it. Where we  
see that, we applaud it.  We think that is the right role of the board to  
say we are going to support management in taking an action against 
those individuals that knowingly violated law, violated the company’s 
own standards and practices, and colluded or committed fraud in which 
to do that. In the past, companies would have taken a soft landing to not 
invite lawsuits. I am seeing a change in behavior and to actually deal 
with the cultural issues is probably appropriate. 
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Helfer: I think that is exactly right. That is happening. It is not 
easy for the board to do. But, one of the reasons it is important for the 
company to do it is that one would hope that this will encourage quicker 
escalation of issues in the future. The goal is to send the message that 
we are serious, that we want to know about these things. There likely 
were a lot of people who knew what was going on, not all of whom 
were directly involved in formulating the fraud or benefitting from it. 
You want to create an atmosphere in which those other people will find 
a way to escalate the issue so that something will be done about it as 
quickly as possible. 
 
Broome: Many thanks to The Clearing House, to the wonderful 
panelist, and the audience for its engagement in the discussion on the 
important issues relating to heightened standards for bank directors. 
